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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue on appeal is whether an individual debtor's 
bankruptcy plan that proposes to repay a loan drawn from 
a retirement system without first paying unsecured 
creditors in full conforms with the Bankruptcy Code and, in 
particular, whether it violates 11 U.S.C. S 1325(b)(1). 
Debtors, Luisa Anes and Robert and Beverly Tierney, 
appeal the District Court's judgment to uphold the 
dismissal of their respective voluntary Chapter 13 
bankruptcy petitions. The appeals in these otherwise 
unrelated bankruptcy cases were consolidated on April 6, 
1998. See In re Anes, 216 B.R. 514, 514 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 
1998) (noting joint disposition of In re Anes and In re 
Tierney). 
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I 
 
Luisa Anes is a New York City employee who participates 
in a mandatory pension plan administered by the New York 
City Employees Retirement System. Contributions are 
deducted from her paycheck on a monthly basis. In 
September 1995, Anes obtained a loan from the Retirement 
System. The application characterized the loan as being 
made not from Anes' pension fund but from "other 
retirement system funds." Anes was permitted to borrow no 
more than 75% of the balance in her pension account. 
Payments on the loan, including interest, are deducted 
from her paycheck, in addition to her regular pension 
contribution. If she fails to pay off the loan, the balance will 
be deducted from her pension balance. 
 
Robert Tierney is a New Jersey firefighter whose 
mandatory pension is administered by the New Jersey 
Police and Fireman's Retirement Fund. In May 1996, he 
borrowed money from the fund under terms that allow 
employees to borrow no more than 50% of the amount of 
their retirement account. Loan payments are withheld from 
Tierney's paycheck. If he fails to pay off the loan, the 
balance owed will be deducted from his retirement account. 
 
Both Anes and the Tierneys (Robert and his wife Beverly) 
filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy on August 23, 1996, 
proposing to make full loan repayments by way of paycheck 
deductions but no payments to their unsecured creditors. 
After Charles Dehart, the bankruptcy trustee, objected to 
the respective plans, the Bankruptcy Court rejected them, 
ruling that the Debtors had not borrowed money from their 
respective pension plans but rather had withdrawn funds 
from their retirement accounts. Because the debtors did not 
have a debt to the Retirement System, the court ruled they 
could not "repay" that debt under their bankruptcy plans. 
See In re Anes, 216 B.R. at 514-15. The District Court 
affirmed,1 see In re Anes, No. 98-CV-0314, typescript op. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court agreed with the Bankruptcy Court "that a loan 
taken against a retirement account is not a `debt.' " In re Anes, No. 98- 
CV-0314 at 3. It further concluded that because the payments were not 
directed at debts they constituted disposable income and had to be used 
to satisfy unsecured creditors under the Chapter 13 plans. See id. 
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2-4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1998), and Debtors now appeal. We 
will affirm, but on a different theory. 
 
II 
 
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1334. Confirmation of a proposed bankruptcy plan is a 
core bankruptcy matter. See 28 U.S.C. S 157(b)(2)(L). The 
District Court, therefore, had jurisdiction to hear an appeal 
from the Bankruptcy Court's decision under 28 U.S.C. 
S 158(a); our jurisdiction is provided by 28 U.S.C. S 158(d). 
In core matters, the District Court reviews the Bankruptcy 
Court's findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of 
law de novo. See Meridian Bank v. Alten, 958 F.2d 
1226,1229 (3d Cir. 1992). We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court's determination, exercising the same 
review exercised by the District Court over the Bankruptcy 
Court. See In re Continental Airlines, 125 F.3d 120, 128 (3d 
Cir. 1997). 
 
III 
 
The trustee contends that, whether or not the Debtors' 
obligation to repay their respective retirement systems 
constitutes a debt for bankruptcy-law purposes, the 
repayment is impermissible under 11 U.S.C. S 1325(b)(1), 
which provides: 
 
       If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured 
       claim objects to the confirmation of the plan, then the 
       court may not approve the plan unless, as of the 
       effective date of the plan-- 
 
        (A) the value of the property to be distribute d under 
       the plan on account of such claim is not less than the 
       amount of such claim; or 
 
        (B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's  projected 
       disposable income to be received in the three-year 
       period beginning on the date that the first payment is 
       due under the plan will be applied to make payments 
       under the plan. 
 
Because the trustee has objected to the Debtors' plans and 
the plans would not repay the unsecured creditors in full, 
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the plans can be confirmed only under S 1325(b)(1)(B), 
requiring all of the debtors' projected disposable income to 
be applied to unsecured debts for three years. Disposable 
income, for individuals not engaged in business such as 
Anes and the Tierney's, is that income "not reasonably 
necessary to be expended for the maintenance or support of 
the debtor or a dependent of the debtor . . . ." Id. 
S 1325(b)(2)(A). Section 1325(b)(1)(B) contains no exception 
for repayment of secured debts. Debtors, therefore, can 
make the proposed payments only if those payments are 
reasonably necessary for their maintenance or support. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that 
repayment of amounts withdrawn from retirement accounts 
is not reasonably necessary for a debtor's maintenance or 
support, requiring that payments be made, if at all, only 
after satisfaction of all unsecured debts. See Harshbarger v. 
Pees (In re Harshbarger), 66 F.3d 775, 777 (6th Cir. 1995); 
accord In re Gilliam, 227 B.R. 849, 851 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 
1998); In re Scott, 142 B.R. 126, 134 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
1992). We agree. If the Debtors do not make the proposed 
payments, the retirement systems will deduct the balance 
owed from their retirement accounts. The payments, even if 
classified as debt payments, therefore, will increase their 
retirement benefits rather than repay the retirement 
systems or ensure the viability of either pension system. In 
effect, the payments are contributions to the Debtors' 
retirement accounts. Voluntary contributions to retirement 
plans, however, are not reasonably necessary for a debtor's 
maintenance or support and must be made from disposable 
income. See In re Cornelius, 195 B.R. 831, 835 (Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. 1995); In re Cavanaugh, 175 B.R. 369, 373 & n.3 
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1994); In re Fountain, 142 B.R. 135, 137 
(Bankr. E.D. Va.1992); In re Festner, 54 B.R. 532, 533 
(Bankr. E.D.N.C.1985). As one bankruptcy court explained 
in refusing to confirm a plan that proposed to make 
mortgage payments on non-residential property rather than 
satisfy unsecured creditors, "[a]lthough investments may be 
financially prudent, they certainly are not necessary 
expenses for the support of the debtors or their dependents. 
Investments of this nature are therefore made with 
disposable income; disposable income is not what is left 
after they are made." In re Lindsey, 122 B.R. 157, 158 
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(Bankr. M.D. Fla.1991). Debtors' proposed payments, 
regardless of their financial prudence, must be understood 
as being made out of "disposable income" under the terms 
of their proposed plans. 
 
Without disputing that the loan payments are not 
reasonably necessary to their maintenance or support, 
Debtors argue the payments are nevertheless permissible 
under S 1325(b)(1), contending primarily that disallowance 
of repayment of retirement plan loans will create 
counterproductive incentives for people anticipating 
bankruptcy. Debtors maintain that a person expecting to 
file for bankruptcy who needs to purchase an asset 
necessary for his or her maintenance or support (such as 
an automobile) will choose to finance the purchase with a 
loan secured by the asset (an automobile loan) rather than 
by borrowing against retirement funds, because payments 
on a loan secured by an asset necessary for a debtor's 
maintenance or support are permissible under S 1325(b)(1). 
Because the interest rate on a loan from a retirement plan 
may be lower than one secured by an asset such as an 
automobile, Debtors assert that the Bankruptcy Court's 
decision will increase total debt levels and reduce 
unsecured creditors' recovery. Debtors also contend that 
those with debts to their retirement systems will be 
encouraged to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 rather 
than Chapter 13, because Chapter 7 permits discharge of 
debts without regard to debtor's use of future income, see 
11 U.S.C. S 726, freeing the debtor to build up his or her 
retirement account. 
 
Where, as here, the language of a statute is 
unambiguous, we will enforce that language as long as "the 
statutory scheme is coherent and consistent." Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Therefore, Debtors' objections to 
S 1325(b)(1)'s consequences, if valid, must be directed to 
Congress. 
 
As we have noted, the proposed loan payments are 
properly understood to be payments made using disposable 
income. Because the proposed plans call for repayment of 
the respective retirement systems out of disposable income 
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without full satisfaction of the Debtors' unsecured debts, 
they were properly rejected under S 1325(b)(1)(B).2 
 
IV 
 
Debtors contend their retirement systems have a right to 
deduct loan payments from their respective paychecks 
under the doctrine of recoupment. Maintaining that neither 
they nor the Bankruptcy Court can prevent the retirement 
systems from effectuating these deductions, Debtors assert 
that recoupment may be made in preference to other 
creditors' claims. Debtors, however, are mistaken as to the 
applicability of recoupment. 
 
The law of recoupment is best understood in contrast to 
the related doctrine of setoff. See University Med. Ctr. v. 
Sullivan (In re University Med. Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065, 1079 
(3d Cir. 1992). "The right of setoff (also called `offset') allows 
entities that owe each other money to apply their mutual 
debts against each other, thereby avoiding `the absurdity of 
making A pay B when B owes A.' " Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 
516 U.S. 16, 18 (1995) (citation omitted). With exceptions 
not relevant here, Congress has specified that bankruptcy 
law does not affect a creditor's right of setoff, provided that 
both the creditor's claim against the debtor and the debtor's 
claim against the creditor arose before the debtor went into 
bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. S 553(a); 3 University Med. Ctr., 
973 F.2d at 1079. 
 
The common-law doctrine of recoupment "is not codified 
in the Bankruptcy Code, but has been established through 
decisional law." Megafoods Stores, Inc. v. Flagstaff Realty 
Assocs. (In re Flagstaff Realty Assocs.), 60 F.3d 1031, 1035 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Having determined that the proposed payments are an inappropriate 
use of disposable income, we need not consider whether Debtors have 
secured debts to their retirement systems. See Harshbarger, 66 F.3d at 
778; Gilliam, 227 B.R. at 851 n.2. 
 
3. "Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362 and 
363 of this title, this title does not affect any right of a creditor to 
offset 
a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title against a claim of such 
creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the 
case . . . ." 11 U.S.C. S 553(a). 
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(3d Cir. 1995). Like a setoff, recoupment permits a creditor 
that owes a debt to the debtor to reduce the amount of its 
debt by the amount of a debt owed by the debtor to the 
creditor. See University Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1079-80; 
Bustamante v. Johnson (In re McConnell), 934 F.2d 662, 
667 (5th Cir. 1991). But the right of recoupment, unlike the 
right to setoff, exists only where the two debts arise out of 
the same transaction. See University Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 
1079; Flagstaff Realty, 60 F.3d at 1035; Newbery Corp. v. 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 95 F.3d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 
1996). A creditor with a right of recoupment generally can 
recoup the full amount owed, to the exclusion of other 
creditors. See Flagstaff Realty, 60 F.3d at 1035 ("A claim 
subject to recoupment avoids the usual bankruptcy 
channels and thus, in essence, is given priority over other 
creditors' claims."); United States Abatement Corp. v. Mobil 
Exploration and Producing U.S., Inc. (In re United States 
Abatement Corp.), 79 F.3d 393, 398 & n.13 (5th Cir. 1996). 
The right of recoupment is not subject to the S 553 
requirement that both debts arise prior to the debtor's entry 
into bankruptcy. See Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875 
(3d Cir. 1984). 
 
Assuming arguendo that Debtors' obligations to repay the 
loans in question constitute a debt for bankruptcy 
purposes, the loan payments nevertheless do not constitute 
recoupment. New York City, for example, would have a 
right to recoup Anes' loan obligation from her salary only if 
Anes' obligation to repay the loan and the city's obligation 
to pay her salary arose from the same transaction. In 
University Med. Ctr., we emphasized that the doctrine of 
recoupment must be narrowly construed in the bankruptcy 
context: 
 
       For the purposes of recoupment, a mere logical 
       relationship is not enough: the "fact that the same two 
       parties are involved, and that a similar subject matter 
       gave rise to both claims, . . . does not mean that the 
       two arose from the `same transaction.' " Rather, both 
       debts must arise out of a single integrated transaction 
       so that it would be inequitable for the debtor to enjoy 
       the benefits of that transaction without also meeting its 
       obligations. Use of this stricter standard for delineating 
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       the bounds of a transaction in the context of 
       recoupment is in accord with the principle that this 
       doctrine, as a non-statutory, equitable exception to the 
       automatic stay, should be narrowly construed. 
 
973 F.2d at 1081 (quoting Lee, 739 F.2d at 875 and citing 
Ashland Petroleum Co. v. Appel (In re B&L Oil Co.), 782 F.2d 
155, 158 (10th Cir. 1986)) (omission in original). Anes' debt 
arises from the loan she obtained from the Retirement 
System, whereas the city's obligation to pay her salary 
arises from her contract of employment and performance of 
her job. These obligations cannot satisfy the University Med. 
Ctr. standard. The connection between Tierney's obligation 
to the New Jersey Police and Fireman's Retirement Fund 
and New Jersey's obligation to pay him for performance of 
his duties as a firefighter similarly cannot meet the 
University Med. Ctr. test. 
 
The respective retirement systems also may not continue 
to deduct loan payments in preference to unsecured 
creditors under the law of setoff. Assuming again that Anes 
has a debt to the Retirement System, the System has at 
most a right to set off Anes' debt against the city's 
obligation to pay Anes' salary. Section 553(a), however, 
does not exempt the setoff from S 1325(b)(1). Section 553(a) 
exempts a creditor's right of setoff from the bankruptcy 
code only where each party's obligation arose prior to 
commencement of the bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. 
S 553(3); see also University Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1079; 
Davidovich v. Welton (In re Davidovich), 901 F.2d 1533, 
1537 (10th Cir. 1990). Anes' debt to the Retirement System 
(if debt it was) arose when she obtained the loan, before she 
entered bankruptcy. The city, however, has no obligation to 
pay Anes' salary until she performs the services for which 
she is employed. Any setoff of Anes' salary against her 
alleged debt to the Retirement System, therefore, must be 
consistent with S 1325(b)(1). The same dynamic applies in 
Tierney's case requiring any setoff to conform to 
S 1325(b)(1)'s requirements. 
 
Because the salary deductions are neither a recoupment 
nor a valid setoff under S 553(a), we agree with those courts 
that have held that a bankruptcy court may order an 
employer to stop deducting a debtor's payments on a loan 
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from the debtor's retirement account from the debtor's 
salary. See In re Delnero, 191 B.R. 539, 543 (Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Carpenter, 23 B.R. 318, 320 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. 1982). 
 
V 
 
For the reasons given, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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